Pointer semantics describing a formal language with the possibility of self-reference have been invented by Haim Gaifman; they form a fundamental way of understanding the semantics of logic programming, but have also been used extensively in philosophical logic and other applications of logic. In pointer semantics, truth values flow backwards along from the defining statement to the propositional variable. As a consequence, pointer semantics cannot deal properly with dependence networks that have terminal nodes. Ghosh, Löwe and Scorelle have proposed an abstract system of combining pointer semantics with forward flow of truth values. Their system was difficult to handle, and apart from the fact that the system could handle some enlightening examples, very few theoretical insights were made. In this paper, we now produce a more concrete variant of this system, built on threevalued logic which allows us to gain more theoretical control over its properties.
Introduction
Pointer semantics were invented by Haim Gaifman (Gai88; Gai92) as a formal propositional language for finitely many propositions {p 0 , ..., p n } defined in terms of each other. The language of pointer semantics is closely related to logic programming and is the logical reflection of the "Revision Theory of Truth" (Her82; GB93). Phenomena such as selfreference can be studied in pointer semantics as has been done in detail in Bolander's PhD thesis (Bol03) in a graphtheoretic setting where the dependence of a proposition p i on a proposition p j is represented by an edge from i to j in the dependency graph. The revision rules of pointer semantics let the truth value of p j affect the truth value of p i ; we can say that truth values "flow backwards in the dependency graph".
In (Löw06), the second author proposed to apply the ideas of pointer semantics to a belief framework, interpreting the propositions not just as being defined in terms of each other, but at the same time being sources of information. As soon as you see propositions as sources of information, the pointer semantics model with its backward flow of truth values is not adequate anymore. The paradigmatic example for this is the following situation:
"Suppose a reasoning agent is sitting in an office without windows. Next to him is his colleague, also located in the office without windows; the agent is simultaneously talking to his friend on the phone who is sitting in a street café. Friend: Everything your colleague says is false; the sun is shining! Colleague: Everything your friend says is false; it is raining! This situation can be described by the following graph:
As in the Nested Liars, there are two consistent truth value assignments, but the context makes sure that one of them is intuitively preferred, as the agent's friend has first hand experience of the weather in the street café." (GLS07, Even if you assume that the agent trusts F, but initially believes in S (i.e., we would expect a belief revision), Gaifman pointer semantics will never change the value of S, as truth values only propagate backwards, and thus the values of terminal nodes in the dependency graph will never be revised.
In the context of belief, this is not a realistic feature: our trust in F, who tells us that S is true, should influence us to change our initial belief about S. Formally, we would need forward propagation of truth values along the dependency graph.
This idea has been implemented in a formal system in (GLS07), but the system proposed by the authors (using the interval [−1, 1] as the truth values and a relatively complicated numerical function to combine the backward and forward influences) did not shed much light into divulging the intricate properties of belief change.
In this paper, we propose a more translucent system and discuss some of its properties. In the section "Definitions", we give the basic definitions, building on the formal system from (Löw06; GLS07), introducing an abstract algebra of pointer systems, and proving that this abstract algebra has logical properties if you restrict your system to backward propagation ("B-operators"). We then extend the concept of pointer semantics to include forward propagation in our section "Belief Semantics with Forward Propagation". In the section "Properties of our Belief Semantics" we test our system in an example originally used in (GLS07) and finally see that our system is ostensibly non-logical. However, this should not come as a shock, as the system is intended to model systems of belief:
"The fact that the logic of belief, even rational belief, does not meet principles of truth-functional deductive logic, should no longer surprise us (Gol75, p. 6)." Leaving the empirical study of comparing this system with our intuitions for future endeavors, we focus on the test case mentioned above to show non-trivial properties of the system, with some concluding remarks.
Definitions Abstract Pointer Semantics
Fix a finite set of propositional variables {p 0 , ..., p n }. An expression is just a propositional formula using ∧, ∨, and ¬ and some of the propositional variables or the empty sequence, denoted by .
We fix a finite algebra of truth values T with operations ∧, ∨ and ¬ corresponding to the syntactic symbols. We assume a notion of order corresponding to information content that gives rise to a notion of infimum in the algebra of truth values, allowing to form inf(X) for some subset of X ⊆ T. A truth value will represent the lowest information content (i.e., a least element in the given order); this truth value will be denoted by ½. We allow inf to be applied to the empty set and let inf ∅ := ½.
Our salient example is the algebra T := {0, ½, 1} with the following operations ("strong Kleene"):
The value ½ stands for ignorance, and thus the infimum is defined as inf({t}) := t, inf({½}∪X) := ½, inf({0, 1}) := ½. This algebra of truth values will be used in this paper, even though the set-up in this section is more general.
If E is an expression and p i is one of the propositional variables, then p i ←E is a clause. We intuitively interpret p i ←E as "p i states E". If E 0 , ..., E n are expressions, a set of clauses Σ := {p 0 ←E 0 , ..., p n ←E n } is called a pointer system. An interpretation is a function I : {p 0 , ..., p n } → T assigning truth values to propositional letters. Note that if T is finite, the set of interpretations is a finite set (we shall use this later). A given interpretation I can be naturally extended to a function assigning truth values to all expressions (using the operations ∧, ∨ and ¬ on T). We denote this extended function with the same symbol I.
A clause can be transformed into an equation in T: if p i ←E is a clause, we can read it as an equation p i = E in T. If Q is such an equation, we say that an interpretation I is a solution of Q if plugging the values {I(p 0 ), ..., I(p n )} into the corresponding variables of the equation results in the same value left and right of the equals sign. An interpretation is a solution of a set of equations if it is a solution of each equation in the set.
A function mapping interpretations to interpretations is called a revision function; a family of these functions indexed by pointer systems is called a revision operator. If δ is a revision operator, we write δ Σ for the revision function assigned to the pointer system Σ (and sometimes just write δ if Σ is clear from the context). We use the usual notation for iteration of revision functions, i.e., δ 0 (I) := I, δ n+1 (I) := δ(δ n (I)). Given a pointer system {p 0 ←E 0 , ..., p n ←E n }, we define its dependency graph by letting {0, ..., n} be the vertices and allowing an edge from i to j if p j occurs in E i . Given a proposition p i , arrows point to i from the propositions occurring in E i , and thus we call a revision operator δ an Boperator (for "backward") if the value of δ(I)(p i ) only depends on the values of I(p j ) for p j occurring in E i .
Fix Σ and δ. We call an interpretation I (Σ, δ)-stable if there is some k such that for all n ≥ k, δ n (I) = I. We call I (Σ, δ)-recurring if for every k there is a n ≥ k such that δ n (I) = I.
1 If Σ is fixed by the context, we drop it from the notation and call interpretations δ-stable and δ-recurring. If H is an interpretation, we consider the sequence H ∞ := {δ i (H) ; i ∈ N} of interpretations occurring in the infinite iteration of δ on H. Clearly, if there is a stable interpretation in H ∞ , then this is the only recurring interpretation in H ∞ . We write Rec Σ,δ (H) for the set of recurring interpretations in H ∞ . Note that since the set of interpretations in finite, this set must be non-empty. If I ∈ Rec Σ,δ (H), then there are i, j > 0 such that I = δ i (H) = δ i+j (H). Then for every k < j and every n, we have δ i+k = δ i+n·j+k (H), so the sequence H ∞ exhibits a periodicity of length j (or a divisor of j). After the first occurrance of an I ∈ Rec Σ,δ (H), all further elements of H ∞ are recurring as well, and in particular, there is a recurring J such that δ(J) = I. We shall call this an I-predecessor and will use this fact in our proofs.
Finally, we define our semantics and let
An algebra of pointer systems
In the language of abstract pointer systems, the possibility of complicated referential structures means that the individual proposition cannot be evaluated without its context.
As a consequence, the natural notion of logical operations is not that between propositions, but that between systems. In this section, we define conjunction, disjunction and negation of statements in pointer systems. The definitions are straightforward, but very little systematic work has been done.
If Σ = {p 0 ←E 0 , ..., p n ←E n } is a pointer system and 0 ≤ i ≤ n, we define a pointer system that corresponds to the negation of p i with one additional propositional variable
If we have two pointer systems Σ 0 = {p 0 ←E 0,0 , ..., p n0 ←E 0,n0 }, and
we make their sets of propositions disjoint by considering a set {p 0 , ..., p n0 , p * 0 , ..., p * n1 , p * } of n 0 +n 1 +2 propositional variables. We then set
With this, we can now define two new pointer systems (with an additional propositional variable p * ):
Logical properties of Gaifman pointer semantics
Fix a system Σ = {p 0 ←E 0 , ..., p n ←E n }. A proposition p i is called a terminal node if E i = ; it is called a source node if p i does not occur in any of the expressions E 0 , ..., E n . This corresponds directly to the properties of i in the dependency graph: p i is a terminal node if and only if i has no outgoing edges in the dependency graph, and it is a source node if and only if i has no incoming edges in the dependency graph. The Gaifman-Tarski operator δ B is defined as follows:
Note that this operator can be described as follows:
"From the clause pi←Ei form the equation Qi by replacing the occurrences of pi on the right-hand side of the equality sign with the values I(pi). If pi is a terminal node, let δ(I)(pi) := I(pi). Otherwise, let I * be the unique solution to the system of equations {Q0, ..., Qn} and let δ(I)(pi) := I * (pi)."
This more complicated description will provide the motivation for the forward propagation operator δ F in the section "Belief semantics with forward propagation". The operator δ B gives rise to a logical system, as the semantics defined by δ B are compatible with the operations in the algebra of pointer systems.
Proposition 1 Let Σ = {p 0 ←E 0 , ..., p n ←E n } be a pointer system. For any i ≤ n, we have
Proof. In this proof, we shall denote interpretations for the set {p 0 , ..., p n } by capital letters I and J and interpretations for the bigger set {p 0 , ..., p n , p ¬ } by lettersÎ andĴ. It is enough to show that ifÎ is δ B -recurring, then there is some δ B -recurring J such thatÎ(p ¬ ) = ¬J(p i ). If I is δ B -recurring, we call J an I-predecessor if J is also δ Brecurring and δ B (J) = I, and similarly forÎ. It is easy to see that every δ B -recurring I (orÎ) has an I-predecessor (or I-predecessor) which is not necessarily unique.
As δ B is a B-operator, we have that ifĴ is δ B -recurring, then so is J :=Ĵ {p 0 , ..., p n }. Now letÎ be δ B -recurring and letĴ be one of itsÎ-predecessors. Then by the above, J :=Ĵ {p 0 , ..., p n } is δ B -recurring and
Proposition 2 Let Σ 0 = {p 0 ←E 0 , ..., p n ←E n } and Σ 1 = {p 0 ←F 0 , ..., p m ←F m } be pointer systems. For any i, j ≤ n, we have
Similarly for ∨ replaced by ∧.
Proof. The basic idea is very similar to the proof of Proposition 1, except that we have to be a bit more careful to see how the two systems Σ 0 and Σ 1 can interact in the bigger system. We reserve letters I 0 and J 0 for the interpretations on Σ 0 , I 1 and J 1 for those on Σ 1 and I and J for interpretations on the whole system, including p * . If Σ 0 , p 1 = 1, then any δ B -recurring I must have I(p * ) = 1 by the ∨-analogue of the argument given in the proof of Proposition 1. Similarly, for Σ 1 , p j = 1 and the case that Σ 0 , p i = Σ 1 , p j = 0. This takes care of six of the nine possible cases.
If I 0 and I 1 are δ B -recurring, then so is the function I := δ(I 0 ) ∪ δ(I 1 ) ∪ { p * , I 0 (p i ) ∨ I 1 (p j ) } (if I 0 is kperiodic and I 1 is -periodic, then I is at most k · -periodic). In particular, if we have such an I 0 with I 0 (p i ) = ½ and an I 1 with I 1 (p j ) = 1, then I(p * ) = ½ (and symmetrically for interchanged rôles). Similarly, if we have recurring interpretations for relevant values 0 and 1 for both small systems, we can put them together to δ B -recurring interpretations with values 0 and 1 for the big system. This gives the truth value ½ for the disjunction in the remaining three cases.
Note that the proof does not really depend on the particular operator δ B . Other B-operators, as long as the logical connectives are properly represented by our semantical rules for the revised values of p ¬ and p * , will be fine here. This shows that δ B interacts with our algebra of pointer systems to give rise to a logical system.
Belief semantics with forward propagation
In (GLS07), the authors gave a revision operator that incorporated both backward and forward propagation. The value of δ(I)(p i ) depended on the values of all I(p j ) such that j is H0 δB(H0) δF(H0) H1 δB(H1) δF(H1) H2 δB(H2) δF(H2) H3 δB(H3) δF(H3) H4
Figure 1: The first three iterations of values of H 0 = (0, 1, 0, ½, ½) up to the point of stability (H 3 = (1, 1, 0, 0, 1)).
connected to i in the dependency graph. 2 Here, we split the operator in two parts: the backward part which is identical to the Gaifman-Tarski operator, and the forward part which we shall define now.
In analogy to the definition of δ B , we define δ F as follows. Given an interpretation I, we transform each clause p i ←E i of the system into an equation Q i ≡ I(p i ) = E i where the occurrences of the p i on the left-hand side of the equation are replaced by their I-values and the ones on the right-hand side are variables. We obtain a system {Q 0 , ..., Q n } of n + 1 equations in T. Note that we cannot mimic the definition of δ B directly: as opposed to the equations in that definition, the system {Q 0 , ..., Q n } need not have a solution, and if it has one, it need not be unique. We therefore define: if p i is a source node, then δ F (I)(p i ) := I(p i ). Otherwise, let S be the set of solutions to the system of equations {Q 0 , ..., Q n } and let δ F (I)(p i ) := inf{I(p i ) ; I ∈ S} (remember that inf ∅ = ½). Note that this definition is literally the dual to definition (*) of δ B (i.e., it is obtained from (*) by interchanging "right-hand side" by "left-hand side" and "terminal node" by "source node").
We now combine δ B and δ F to one operator δ T by defining pointwise
where ⊗ has the following truth table:
Let us briefly motivate this table. The values for agreement (0 ⊗ 0, ½ ⊗ ½, and 1 ⊗ 1) are obvious choices. The two values for complete disagreement (0 ⊗ 1 and 1 ⊗ 0) are also relatively clear: as long as you do not want to give one of the two directions primacy over the other, you have little choice but give the value ½ of ignorance. For reasons of symmetry, this leaves two values ½ ⊗ 0 = 0 ⊗ ½ and ½ ⊗ 1 = 1 ⊗ ½ to be decided. We opted here for the most informative truth table that gives classical values the benefit of the doubt. The other options would be the tables
2 Actually, the system was even more complicated, as interpretations did not only provide values for the vertices, but also for the edges in the dependency graph.
Each of these connectives will give rise to a slightly different semantics. We opted for the first connective ⊗, as the semantics based on the other three seem to have a tendency to stabilize on the value ½ very often (the safe option: in case of confusion, opt for ignorance).
Properties of our belief semantics
As mentioned in the introduction, we should not be shocked to hear that a system modelling belief and belief change does not follow basic logical rules such as Propositions 1 and 2. From its beginnings (Hin62) to modern doxastic systems, logics of belief have always dealt with the peculiarities of the logical structure of belief. Let us take the particular example of conjunction: the fact that belief is not closed under the standard logical rules for conjunction is known as the preface paradox and has been described by Kyburg as "conjunctivitis" (Kyb70; HB99). While the phenomenon of "conjunctivitis" focusses on the fact that something strange happens with the belief of large conjunctions of individually believes propositions, in other contexts (that of the modality of "ensuring that"), we have a problem with simple binary conjunctions (Sch08).
Of course, the failure of certain logical rules in reasoning about belief is closely connected to the so-called "errors in reasoning" observed in experimental psychology, e.g., the famous Wason selection task (Was68). What constitutes rational belief in this context is an interesting question for modellers and philosophers alike (Ste97; Chr07; Cou08).
The fact that reasoning about beliefs is such a complicated topic makes it unlikely that there is one objectively accurate semantics that describes reasoning about beliefs in pointer structures. Instead, different semantics will be relevant in different situations. Which semantics to choose is a decision that the modeller has to make with as much information as possible. This is one of the reasons why we decided for a very lean and easy to survey system (as opposed to the more complicated system of (GLS07)). Let us focus on some concrete examples to validate our claim that the semantics we propose do agree with intuitive understanding, and thus serve as a quasi-empirical test for our system as a formalization of reasoning in self-referential situations with evidence.
Concrete examples
So far, we have just given an abstract system of belief flow in our pointer systems. In order to check whether our system results in intuitively plausible results, we have to check
Figure 2: The first three iterations of values of H * 0 = (0, 1, 0, ½, 0, 1, 0, ½, ½) up to the point of stability (H * 4 = (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1) ).
a few examples. Keep in mind that our goal should be to model human reasoning behaviour in the presence of partially paradoxical situations. In this paper, we can only give a first attempt at testing the adequacy of our system: an empirical test against natural language intuitions on a much larger scale is needed. For this, also cf. our section "Discussion and Future Work".
The Liar As usual, the liar sentence is interpreted by the system Σ := {p 0 ←¬p 0 }. Since we have only one propositional variable, interpretations are just elements of T = {0, ½, 1}. It is easy to see that
This means that the δ T -behaviour of the liar sentence is equal to the Gaifman-semantics behaviour.
The Miller-Jones Example Consider the following test example from (GLS07):
Professors Jones, Miller and Smith are colleagues in a computer science department. Jones and Miller dislike each other without reservation and are very liberal in telling everyone else that "everything that the other one says is false". Smith just returned from a trip abroad and needs to find out about two committee meetings on Monday morning. He sends out e-mails to his colleagues and to the department secretary. He asks all three of them about the meeting of the faculty, and Jones and the secretary about the meeting of the library committee (of which Miller is not a member). Jones replies: "We have the faculty meeting at 10am and the library committee meeting at 11am; by the way, don't believe anything that Miller says, as he is always wrong." Miller replies: "The faculty meeting was cancelled; by the way don't believe anything that Jones says, as he is always wrong." The secretary replies: "The faculty meeting is at 10 am and the library committee meeting is at 11 am. But I am sure that Professor Miller told you already as he is always such an accurate person and quick in answering e-mails: everything Miller says is correct." (GLS07, p. 
Discussion and future work
Testing the behaviour of our system on the liar sentence and one additional example cannot be enough as an empirical test of the adequacy of our system. After testing more examples and having developed some theoretical insight into the system and its properties, we would consider testing the system experimentally by designing situations in which people reason about beliefs in self-referential situations with evidence, and then compare the predictions of our system to the actual behaviour of human agents.
Such an experimental test should not be done with just one system, but with a class of systems. We have already discussed that our choice of the connective ⊗ combining δ B and δ F to δ T was not unique. Similarly, the rules for how to handle multiple solutions ("take the pointwise infimum") in the case of forward propagation are not the only way to deal with this formally. One natural alternative option would be to split the sequence H ∞ into multiple sequences if there are multiple solutions. For instance, if we are trying to calculate δ F (H) and we have multiple solutions to the set of equations, then δ F (H) becomes a set of interpretations (possibly giving rise to different recurrences and stabilities, depending on which possibility you follow). There are many variants that could be defined, but the final arbiter for whether these systems are adequate descriptions of reasoning processes will have to be the experimental test.
